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Medicaid Insurance in Old Age†
By Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones*
The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to 
insure retirees against medical expenses. We estimate a structural 
model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the 
distribution of lifetime Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations 
across currently single retirees. Compensating variation calcula-
tions indicate that current retirees value Medicaid insurance at more 
than its actuarial cost, but that most would value an expansion of the 
current Medicaid program at less than its cost. These findings sug-
gest that for current single retirees, the Medicaid program may be of 
the approximately right size. (JEL C51, H51, I13)
Many elderly households benefit from Medicaid, a  means-tested, public health 
insurance program. Despite the increasing importance of Medicaid in the presence 
of an aging population and rising medical costs, very little is known about how 
Medicaid payments are distributed among the elderly and how the elderly value 
these payments. Which elderly households receive Medicaid transfers? How redis-
tributive are these transfers and the taxes needed to finance them? What is the insur-
ance value of these transfers? Is Medicaid of about the right size? How much would 
people lose if it were cut? These are important questions to answer before reforming 
the programs currently in place. In this paper we seek to fill this gap.
We focus on single retirees, who comprise about 50 percent of people aged 70 
or older and 70 percent of households aged 70 or older. We document new facts 
on Medicaid recipiency in the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD) data and show that, while the recipiency rate in the bottom income quin-
tile is around 70 percent throughout retirement, the recipiency rate of  higher-income 
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retirees is initially very low, but increases with age, reaching 20 percent by age 
95. Thus, even high-income people become Medicaid recipients if they live long 
enough and are hit by expensive medical conditions. Moreover, we document new 
facts from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and show that high-in-
come individuals, conditional on receiving Medicaid transfers, actually receive 
larger transfers than low-income individuals.
The data show who ends up on Medicaid, how much they receive from Medicaid, 
how much wealth they hold, and how much they spend on medical goods and 
services. However, to assess how much retirees value the insurance provided by 
Medicaid and to perform counterfactuals, we need a model. We thus develop and 
estimate a  life-cycle model of consumption and endogenous medical expenditure 
that accounts for Medicare, Supplemental Social Insurance (SSI), and Medicaid. 
Agents in the model face uncertainty about their health, lifespan, and medical needs 
(including nursing home stays). This uncertainty is partially offset by the insur-
ance provided by the government and private institutions. Agents choose whether to 
apply for Medicaid if they are eligible, how much to save, and how to split their con-
sumption between medical and  nonmedical goods. Consistent with program rules, 
we model two pathways to Medicaid, one for the lifelong poor, and one for people 
impoverished by large medical expenses.
To appropriately evaluate Medicaid redistribution, we allow for heterogeneity in 
wealth, permanent income, health, gender, life expectancy, and medical needs. We 
estimate the model by matching  life-cycle profiles of assets,  out-of-pocket medical 
spending, and Medicaid recipiency rates for elderly singles across different cohorts 
and permanent income groups. We also require our model to fit the data across the 
entire income distribution, rather than simply explain mean or median behavior. 
Matching Medicaid recipiency introduces an unexpected angle in the identification 
of bequest motives. To match Medicaid recipiency rates, Medicaid must be fairly 
generous, which in turn reduces medical expense risk. To reconcile high observed 
asset holdings with reduced medical expense risk, a bequest motive is necessary.
Our model matches its targets well and produces parameter estimates within the 
bounds established by previous work. It also generates an elasticity of total medical 
expenditures to  co-payment changes that is close to the one estimated by Manning 
et al. (1987) using the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Moreover, although 
our model was not required to match Medicaid payments, it turns out to match the 
corresponding data from the MCBS survey.
Our model shows that the current Medicaid system provides different kinds of 
insurance to households with different resources. Households in the lower perma-
nent income quintiles are much more likely to receive Medicaid transfers, but the 
transfers that they receive are on average relatively small. Households in the higher 
permanent income quintiles are much less likely to receive any Medicaid transfers, 
but when they do these transfers are very big and correspond to severe and expensive 
medical conditions. Therefore, and consistent with the MCBS data, Medicaid is an 
effective insurance device for the poorest, but also offers valuable insurance to the 
rich, by insuring them against catastrophic medical conditions, which are the most 
costly in terms of utility and the most difficult to insure in the private market.
We also find that, with moderate risk aversion and realistic lifetime and med-
ical needs risk, the value most retirees place on Medicaid insurance exceeds the 
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 actuarial value of their expected payments. For example, if we decrease the dis-
counted present value of Medicaid payments by a dollar, to maintain the same level 
of utility a retired person at the bottom of the income distribution would have to 
be compensated by more than a dollar, and a person at the top of the distribution 
would have to be compensated by more than $3. On the other hand, we find that a 
Medicaid expansion would be valued by most retirees at less than its cost. These 
comparisons of the transfers’ actuarial values to their recipients’ valuations suggest 
that the current Medicaid program for most currently single retirees is about the 
right size.
Our calculations also show that it is the richer retirees who value Medicaid most 
highly and thus might be most in favor of a Medicaid expansion. However, this 
comparison does not take into account the subsidization implied by Medicaid taxes. 
Using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimate the dis-
tribution of  Medicaid-related taxes. Our PSID computations indicate if we decrease 
the discounted present value of Medicaid payments by a dollar, a retired person at 
the bottom of the income distribution would save 0.2 dollars in taxes, and a person 
at the top of the distribution would save nearly $5. Under the current tax system the 
rich would not support an expansion of Medicaid insurance, because the increase in 
their Medicaid tax burden would exceed the increase in their Medicaid valuation.
This paper thus contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, it evalu-
ates how Medicaid redistributes across people in a model with rich heterogeneity. 
Second, it uses the model to compute retirees’ valuation of Medicaid insurance in a 
framework that matches the data well and explicitly models the response of savings 
and medical expenditures to the Medicaid rules. Finally, it provides additional iden-
tification of the bequest motive by carefully modeling risks and insurance, and by 
matching Medicaid recipiency and payment rates.
I. Literature Review
This paper is related to previous work on savings, health risks, and social insur-
ance. Kotlikoff (1988) stresses the importance of modeling health expenditures 
when studying precautionary savings, but Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) 
and Palumbo (1999) solve dynamic programming models of saving under medical 
expense risk and find that medical expenses have relatively small effects. However, 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) and Palumbo (1999) likely underestimate 
medical spending risk, because the datasets available at that time miss  late-in-life 
medical spending and have poor measures of nursing home costs. As a result, the 
data understate the extent to which medical expenses rise with age and income.
Using newer and more comprehensive data, De Nardi , French, and Jones (2010) 
and Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2011) find that  late-in-life medical expenses 
are large and generate powerful savings incentives. Furthermore, Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise (2010) show that those in poor health have considerably lower assets than sim-
ilar individuals in good health. Lockwood (2014), Nakajima and Telyukova (2012), 
and Yogo (2009) add to the literature by estimating life-cycle models that include 
additional insurance choices, housing, and portfolio choices, respectively. Laitner, 
Silverman, and Stolyarov (2014) derive analytic expressions which provide intu-
ition for how uncertain longevity and medical expense risk affect savings decisions.
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In this paper, we extend the endogenous medical spending model of De Nardi , 
French, and Jones (2010) to measure the distribution of Medicaid transfers, the 
taxes used to fund the transfers, and the valuations retirees place on them. Relative 
to that paper, we make the following improvements. First, because nearly  two-thirds 
of Medicaid payments to the elderly are to those in nursing homes, we model the 
nursing home state explicitly. Second, we extend the model of Medicaid so that, 
consistent with the institutions, there are two distinct ways to qualify: having low 
income and assets (the “categorically needy” pathway, which incorporates SSI) or 
becoming impoverished by high medical needs (the “medically needy” pathway). 
People at different points of the income distribution qualify for Medicaid benefits 
in different ways and thus receive different insurance. Third, we expand our set of 
econometric targets to include Medicaid eligibility rates, adding an important new 
source of identification. Fourth, we use data from the MCBS and PSID as well as the 
AHEAD, whereas De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) used AHEAD data alone. We 
compare the Medicaid payments observed in the MCBS to those predicted by the 
model. We show that our model matches Medicaid payments well, although they are 
not matched by construction. Furthermore, we use the earnings histories in the PSID 
data to measure lifetime tax payments into the Medicaid system. This allows us to 
better consider who pays for Medicaid, in addition to who benefits from Medicaid.
Earlier studies of Medicaid include Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and 
Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), who argue that  means-tested social 
insurance programs (in the form of a minimum consumption floor) provide strong 
incentives for  low-income individuals not to save. Consistent with this evidence, 
Gardner and Gilleskie (2006) exploit  cross-state variation in Medicaid rules and 
find Medicaid has significant effects on savings. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) 
develop a dynamic model of optimal savings and  long-term care purchase deci-
sions and conclude that Medicaid crowds out private  long-term care insurance for 
about  two-thirds of the wealth distribution. Consistent with this evidence, Brown, 
Coe, and Finkelstein (2007) exploit  cross-state variation in Medicaid rules and also 
find significant crowding out. We also find that Medicaid encourages spending and 
reduces savings.
Several new papers study the importance of medical expense risk in general equi-
librium, including Hansen, Hsu, and Lee (2012), Pashchenko and Porapakkarm 
(2013), and Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2012). Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014) find 
that  old-age medical expenses and the coverage of these expenses provided by 
Medicaid have large effects on aggregate capital accumulation. Braun, Kopecky, 
and Koreshkova (2015) use a model with medical expense risk to assess the incen-
tive and welfare effects of Social Security and  means-tested social insurance pro-
grams like Medicaid. They too find that Medicaid provides the elderly with valuable 
insurance. Compared to these papers, we focus more on valuation and redistribution 
at the individual level and include much more heterogeneity. We allow demographic 
transitions to depend on lifetime earnings, consistent with Hurd (1989) and Hurd, 
McFadden, and Merrill (1999), who highlight the importance of accounting for 
the link between wealth and mortality in  life-cycle models. We estimate our model 
against  life-cycle profiles, rather than calibrating it. Most important, in our model 
people can adjust medical spending, as well as consumption and saving, allowing 
the quality of care to vary.
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Several recent papers also contain  life-cycle models where the choice of med-
ical expenditures is endogenous. In addition to having different emphases, these 
papers model Medicaid in a more stylized way. Fonseca et al. (2009) and Scholz and 
Seshadri (2013) assume that the consumption floor is invariant to medical needs, 
whereas our specification allows for more realistic links between medical needs and 
Medicaid transfers. Ozkan (2011) studies health investments over the life cycle, but 
does not focus on the role of Medicaid. Khwaja (2010) conducts a valuation exer-
cise similar to ours, estimating the willingness of older males to pay for Medicare. 
He does not evaluate Medicaid, however, as very few individuals in his estimation 
sample receive it.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the redistribution generated by 
government programs. Although there is a lot of research about the amount of 
redistribution provided by Social Security and a smaller amount of research about 
Medicare, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to comprehensively 
examine how Medicaid transfers to the elderly are distributed across income 
groups, and to document how even people with higher lifetime income can end 
up on Medicaid.1 Furthermore, we assess the valuation individuals place on their 
expected Medicaid transfers.2 We also estimate the distribution of the taxes used to 
finance these transfers. Unlike Social Security, unemployment benefits, and disabil-
ity insurance, Medicaid is not financed using a specific tax, but by general govern-
ment revenue, making it difficult to determine how redistributive “Medicaid taxes” 
are. Adapting the approach of McClellan and Skinner (2006), we assume that the 
Medicaid tax burden is proportional to the general tax burden.
II. Data
We use two main datasets, the AHEAD and the MCBS. We begin this section 
with an overview of each dataset.
A. The AHEAD Dataset
Our analysis of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD) dataset builds upon the analysis in De Nardi , French, and Jones (2009) 
and De Nardi , French, and Jones (2010). The AHEAD is a survey of individuals 
who were  noninstitutionalized and aged 70 or older in 1994. It is part of the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS) conducted by the University of Michigan. We con-
sider only single (i.e., never married, divorced, or widowed), retired individuals. A 
total of 3,727 singles were interviewed for the AHEAD survey in late 1993 to early 
1994, which we refer to as 1994. These individuals were interviewed again in 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. We drop 229 individuals who were 
partnered with another individual at some point during the sample period or who did 
not remain single until death, and 252 individuals with labor income over $3,000 at 
1 Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006) and McClellan and Skinner (2006) study Medicare progressivity. 
2 Using a simpler, calibrated model, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) analyze how Medicaid affects the valuation 
of  long-term care insurance. Braun, Kopecky, and Koreshkova (2015) calculate the aggregate welfare effects of 
eliminating  means-tested social insurance. 
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some point during the sample period. We are left with 3,246 individuals, of whom 
588 are men and 2,658 are women. Of these 3,246 individuals, 370 are still alive in 
2010. We do not use the 1994 asset or medical expense data. Assets in 1994 were 
underreported (Rohwedder, Haider, and Hurd 2006) and medical expenses appear 
to be underreported as well.
A key advantage of the AHEAD relative to other datasets is that it provides panel 
data on health status, including nursing home stays. We assign individuals a health 
status of “good” if  self-reported health is excellent, very good, or good, and assign 
a health status of “bad” if  self-reported health is fair or poor. We assign individuals 
to the nursing home state if they were in a nursing home at least 120 days since the 
last interview (or on average 60 days per year) or if they spent at least 60 days in a 
nursing home before the next scheduled interview and died before that scheduled 
interview.
We break the data into five cohorts, each of which contains people born within a 
 five-year window. The first cohort consists of individuals that were ages 72 to 76 in 
1996; the second cohort contains ages 77 to 81; the third ages 82 to 86; the fourth 
ages 87 to 91; and the final cohort, for sample size reasons, contains ages 92 to 102. 
Throughout, we will refer to each of these  five-year birth cohorts as a cohort.
Since we want to understand the role of income, we further stratify the data by 
 post-retirement permanent income (PI). We measure PI as the individual’s average 
 non-asset income over all periods during which he or she is observed.  Non-asset 
income includes Social Security benefits, defined benefit pension benefits, veter-
ans benefits, and annuities. Since we model social insurance explicitly, we do not 
include SSI transfers. Because there is a roughly monotonic relationship between 
lifetime earnings and the  non-asset income variables that we use, our measure of PI 
is also a good measure of lifetime permanent income.
B. The MCBS Dataset
An important limitation of the AHEAD data is that it lacks information on other 
payers of medical care, such as Medicaid and Medicare. Although there are some 
 self-reported survey data on total billable medical expenditures in the AHEAD, these 
data are mostly imputed and are considered to be of low quality. To circumvent this 
issue, we use data from the  1996–2010 waves of the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS). Our description and treatment of the MCBS follow those of 
De Nardi et al. (2015), who assess the MCBS medical spending data in detail.
The MCBS is a nationally representative survey of disabled and elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries. Respondents are asked about health status, health insurance, and 
health care expenditures paid  out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, by Medicare, and by 
other sources. The MCBS data are matched to Medicare records, and medical 
expenditure data are created through a reconciliation process that combines sur-
vey information with Medicare administrative files. As a result, it gives extremely 
accurate data on Medicare payments and fairly accurate data on  out-of-pocket and 
Medicaid payments. Both the AHEAD and the MCBS survey include information 
on those who enter a nursing home or die. This is an important advantage compared 
to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which does not capture  late-life 
or nursing home expenses.
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MCBS respondents are interviewed up to 12 times over a  four-year period, form-
ing short panels. We aggregate the data to an annual level. We use the same sample 
selection rules in the MCBS that we use for the AHEAD data. Specifically, we drop 
those who were observed to be married over the sample period, work, or be younger 
than 72 in 1996, 74 in 1998, etc. These sample selection procedures leave us 17,103 
different individuals who contribute 40,157  person-year observations. Details of 
sample construction, as well as validation of the MCBS relative to the aggregate 
national statistics, are in online Appendix A.
As with the AHEAD data, we assign individuals a health status of “good” if 
their  self-reported health is excellent, very good, or good, and a health status of 
“bad” if their  self-reported health is fair or poor. We define an individual as being 
in a nursing home if that individual was in a nursing home at least 60 days over 
the year. In the MCBS, individuals are asked about total income, not annuitized 
income. Fortunately, we found that this variable lines up well with total income in 
the AHEAD. Furthermore, in the AHEAD, the correlation between total income and 
annuitized income is 0.8. Consistent with our computations in the AHEAD, we use 
average total income over the time that we observe an individual as our measure of 
PI in the MCBS.
C. Medicaid Recipiency and Payments
AHEAD respondents are asked whether they are currently covered by Medicaid. 
Figure 1 plots the fraction of the sample receiving Medicaid by age, birth cohort, 
and PI quintile.
The approach we use to stratify the data behind Figure 1, which follows that of 
De Nardi , French, and Jones (2009, 2010), is one we will use repeatedly through-
out the paper. Recall that we stratify the data by PI quintile and cohort. For each 
 cohort-quintile cell, we calculate the Medicaid recipiency rate in each calendar 
year. We then construct  life-cycle profiles by ordering the recipiency rates by 
cohort and age at each year of observation. Moving from the  left-hand side to 
the  right-hand side of our graphs, we thus show data for four cohorts, with each 
cohort’s data starting out at the cohort’s average age in 1996. We omit the profiles 
for the oldest cohort because the sample sizes are tiny. For each cohort in the figure 
there are five horizontal lines, one for each PI quintile. To indicate PI rank, we vary 
the thickness of the lines on our graphs: thicker lines represent observations for 
 higher-ranked PI groupings.
The members of the first cohort appear in our sample at an average age of 74 in 
1996. We then observe them in 1998, when they are on average 76 years old, and 
then again every other year until 2010. The other cohorts start from older initial ages 
and are also followed for 14 years. The graphs report the Medicaid recipiency rate 
for each cohort and PI grouping at eight dates over time. At each sample date, we 
calculate the Medicaid recipiency rate for individuals alive at that date—we use an 
unbalanced panel.  Cohort-PI-year cells with fewer than ten observations are dropped.
Unsurprisingly, Medicaid recipiency is inversely related to PI: the thin top lines 
show the fraction of Medicaid recipients in the bottom 20 percent of the PI distri-
bution, while the thick bottom lines show the recipiency rate for the top 20 percent. 
The top left line shows that for the bottom PI quintile of the cohort aged 74 in 1996, 
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about 70 percent of the sample receives Medicaid in 1996; this fraction stays rather 
stable over time. This is because the poorest people qualify for Medicaid under the 
categorically needy provision, where eligibility depends on income and assets, but 
not the amount of medical expenses.
The Medicaid recipiency rate tends to rise with age most quickly for people in 
the middle and highest PI groups. For example, in the oldest cohort and top two PI 
quintiles the fraction of people receiving Medicaid rises from about 4 percent at age 
89 to over 20 percent at age 96. Even people with relatively large resources can be 
hit by medical shocks severe enough to exhaust their assets and qualify them for 
Medicaid under the medically needy provision.
Table 1 shows average Medicaid benefits, the recipiency rate, and benefits per 
recipient in the MCBS data, conditional on PI quintile. Average payments decline 
with PI. However, this is because recipiency rates also decline by PI. In fact, the 
payments received by each Medicaid recipient increases with PI, from $12,990 at 
the bottom quintile to $23,790 at the top.
D. Medical Expense Profiles
In all survey waves, AHEAD respondents are asked about the medical expenses 
they paid  out-of-pocket.  Out-of-pocket medical expenses are the sum of what the 
Figure 1. Medicaid Recipiency Rates by Cohort, Income, and Age
Notes: Each line represents Medicaid recipiency rates for a cohort-PI cell, traced over the time 
period 1996–2010. Thicker lines refer to higher permanent income groups. Panel A: cohorts 
aged 74 and 84 in 1996. Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 89 in 1996.
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Table 1—Average Medicaid Benefits and Recipiency
Average
Average Recipiency benefit per
Permanent income quintile benefit rate recipient
Bottom 9,080 0.70 12,990
Fourth 5,720 0.42 13,690
Third 2,850 0.16 18,350
Second 1,950 0.08 24,360
Top 1,280 0.05 23,790
Source: MCBS
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individual spends  out-of-pocket on private and Medicare Part B insurance premia, 
drug costs, costs for hospital and nursing home care,3 doctor visits, dental visits, and 
outpatient care. It does not include expenses covered by insurance, either public or 
private. The AHEAD’s expenditure measure is retrospective, as it measures spend-
ing over the previous two years. It includes medical expenses during the last year 
of life, collected through interviews with the deceased’s children or other survivors. 
We annualize the data by dividing the AHEAD’s spending measure by two.
French and Jones (2004) show that the medical expense data in the AHEAD 
line up with the aggregate statistics. For our sample, mean  out-of-pocket medical 
expenses are $4,605 with a standard deviation of $14,450 in 2005 dollars. Although 
this figure is large, it is not surprising, because Medicare did not cover prescription 
drugs for most of the sample period, requires  co-pays for services, and caps the 
number of reimbursed nursing home and hospital nights.
Figures 2 and 3 display the median and ninetieth percentile of the  out-of-pocket 
medical expense distribution, respectively. The graphs highlight the large increase 
in  out-of-pocket medical expenses that occurs as people reach very advanced ages, 
and show that this increase is especially pronounced for people in the highest PI 
quintiles. Protected by Medicaid, individuals in the bottom income quintiles pay 
less  out-of-pocket.
3 Nursing home costs include a food and shelter component, besides medical costs, thus raising the question of 
whether the food and shelter components should be eliminated from the nursing home costs to avoid double count-
ing these items. There are two reasons why this is not as important as one might expect. First, the food and shelter 
component of nursing home costs make up for a small share of total nursing home costs. In fact, when we eliminate 
the food and shelter component of nursing home costs, our medical expense profiles do not change much. Second, 
many retirees in nursing homes keep their houses (whether owned or rented), expecting to go back to them. Hence, 
they are paying for two dwellings and it would be wrong to remove the shelter component of nursing homes from 
these people. Finally, it should be noted that the shelter component is larger than the food component for most single 
retirees. For these reasons we believe that our approach most closely approximates reality. 
Figure 2. Median Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses by Cohort, Income, and Age
Notes: Each line represents median out-of-pocket medical expenditures for a cohort-PI cell, traced over the time 
period 1996–2010. Thicker lines refer to higher permanent income groups. Panel A: cohorts aged 74 and 84 in 1996. 
Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 89 in 1996.
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E. Net Worth Profiles
Our measure of net worth (or assets) is the sum of all assets less mortgages and 
other debts. The AHEAD has information on the value of housing and real estate, 
autos, liquid assets (which include money market accounts, savings accounts, 
 T-bills, etc.), IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, the value of a farm or business, mutual funds, 
bonds, and “other” assets.
Figure 4 reports median assets by cohort, age, and PI quintile. However, the fifth, 
bottom line is hard to distinguish from the horizontal axis because households in 
this PI quintile hold few assets. Unsurprisingly, assets turn out to be monotonically 
increasing in PI, so that the thin bottom lines show median assets in the lowest PI 
quintile, while the thick top lines show median assets for the top quintile. For exam-
ple, the top left line shows that for the top PI quintile of the cohort age 74 in 1996, 
Panel A. Median assets 
by cohort and income: aged 74 and 84
Panel B. Median assets 
by cohort and income: aged 79 and 89
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Figure 3. Ninetieth Percentile of Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses by Cohort, Income, and Age
Notes: Each line represents the ninetieth percentile of out-of-pocket medical expenditures for a cohort-PI cell, 
traced over the time period 1996–2010. Thicker lines refer to higher permanent income groups. Panel A: cohorts 
aged 74 and 84 in 1996. Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 89 in 1996.
Figure 4. Median Assets by Cohort, Income, and Age
Notes: Each line represents median assets for a cohort-PI cell, traced over the time period 1996–2010. Thicker lines 
refer to higher permanent income groups. Panel A: cohorts aged 74 and 84 in 1996. Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 
89 in 1996.
Panel A. Ninetieth percentile OOP medex 
by cohort and income: aged 74 and 84
Panel B. Ninetieth percentile OOP medex 
by cohort and income: aged 79 and 89
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median assets started at $200,000 and then stayed rather stable until the final time 
period: $170,000 at age 76, $190,000 at age 78, $220,000 at age 80, $210,00 at age 
82, $220,000 at age 84, $200,00 at age 86, and $130,000 at age 88.4
For all PI quintiles in these cohorts, the assets of surviving individuals do not 
decline rapidly with age. Those with high PI do not run down their assets until their 
late eighties, although those with low PI tend to have their assets decrease through-
out the sample period. The slow rate at which the elderly deplete their wealth has 
been a  long-standing puzzle (see, for example, Mirer 1979). However, as De Nardi , 
French, and Jones (2010) show, the risk of medical spending rising with age and 
income goes a long way toward explaining this puzzle.
III. The Model
Our model is an extension of the endogenous medical spending model of De Nardi , 
French, and Jones (2010) that allows for richer health dynamics and a more realistic 
(and detailed) formulation of Medicaid. As in De Nardi , French, and Jones (2009, 
2010), we consider only single people, male or female, who have already retired. 
This allows us to abstract from labor supply decisions and from complications aris-
ing from changes in family size.
A. Preferences
Individuals in this model receive utility from the consumption of both  nonmedical 
and medical goods. Each period, their flow utility is given by
(1)  u ( c t ,  m t , μ( · )) =  1 ____ 1 − ν  c t 1−ν + μ ( h t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t)  1 ____ 1 − ω  m t 1−ω ,
where  t is age,  c t is consumption of  nonmedical goods,  m t is total consumption of 
medical goods, and  μ( · ) is the medical needs shifter, which affects the marginal 
utility of consuming medical goods and services. The consumption of both goods 
is expressed in dollar values. The intertemporal elasticities for the two goods,  1/ν 
and  1/ω , can differ.5 One way to interpret the medical spending in the utility func-
tion formulation is that medical spending improves  within-period health. This is a 
simple way to capture endogenous medical spending and is similar to other specifi-
cations used in the literature (Einav et al. 2013; McClellan and Skinner 2006; Bajari 
et al. 2014).
4 The jumps in the profiles are due to the fact that there is dispersion in assets within a cell, and very rapid attri-
tion due to death, especially at very advanced ages. For example, for the highest PI grouping in the oldest cohort, 
the cell count goes from 29 observations, to 20, and finally to 12 toward the end of the sample. Our GMM criterion 
weights each moment condition in proportion to the number of observations, so these cells have little effect on the 
GMM criterion function and thus the estimates. 
5 We assume that preferences are separable between medical and  nonmedical goods, which restricts the set of 
possible price and income elasticities. The parameters of our current specification are identified largely through 
income elasticities, by matching the way in which  out-of-pocket medical spending rises with income at multiple 
ages. However, our specification also generates reasonable price elasticities. Given that a simpler specification 
matches the facts well, we decided to not estimate a more complex  non-separable specification, where identification 
would be less transparent. 
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We assume that  μ( · ) shifts with medical needs, such as dementia, arthritis, or 
a broken bone. These shocks affect the utility of consuming medical goods and 
 services, including nursing home care. Formally, we model  μ( · ) as a function of 
age, the  discrete-valued health status indicator  h t , and the medical needs shocks  ζ t 
and  ξ t . Individuals optimally choose how much to spend in response to these shocks.
As discussed in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), a complementary approach 
is that of Grossman (1972), in which medical expenses represent investments in 
health capital, which in turn decreases mortality (e.g., Yogo 2009) or improves 
health. Although a few studies find that medical expenditures have significant effects 
on health and/or survival (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle 2011; Chay, 
Kim, and Swaminathan 2010), most studies find small effects (Brook et al. 1983; 
Fisher et al. 2003; Finkelstein and McKnight 2008). Interestingly, Finkelstein et 
al. (2012) find that access to Medicaid increases total medical spending, but do not 
find that Medicaid reduces mortality for the  under-65 population. Instead, they find 
that access to Medicaid reduces depression, consistent with our interpretation that 
health care improves utility but not longevity. These findings confirm that the effects 
of medical expenditures on health outcomes are extremely difficult to identify. 
Identification problems include reverse causality (sick people have higher health 
expenditures) and lack of insurance variation (most elderly individuals receive base-
line coverage through Medicare). To get around these problems, Khwaja (2010) 
estimates a structural model in which medical expenditures both improve health 
and provide utility. He finds (page 143) that medical utilization would only decline 
by less than 20 percent over the life cycle if medical care was purely mitigative and 
had no curative or preventive components. Blau and Gilleskie (2008) also estimate 
a structural model and reach similar conclusions.
Given that older people have already shaped their health and lifestyle, we view 
our assumption that their health and mortality depend on their lifetime earnings, but 
are exogenous to their current decisions, to be a reasonable simplification.
B. Insurance Mechanisms
We model two important types of health insurance. The first one pays a pro-
portional share of total medical expenses and can be thought of as a combination 
of Medicare and private insurance. Let  q( h t ) denote the individual’s  co-insurance ( co-pay) rate, i.e., the share of medical expenses not paid by Medicare or private 
insurance. We allow the  co-pay rate to depend on whether a person is in a nurs-
ing home ( h t = 1 ) or not. Because nursing home stays are virtually uninsured 
by Medicare and private insurance, people residing in nursing homes face much 
higher  co-pay rates. However,  co-pay rates do not vary much across other medical 
conditions.
The second type of health insurance that we model is Medicaid, which is 
 means-tested. To link Medicaid transfers to medical needs,  μ( h t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t) , we 
assume that each period Medicaid guarantees a minimum level of flow utility  u _i , 
which potentially differs between categorically needy ( i = c ) and medically needy 
( i = m ) recipients. In practice, the floors for categorically and medically needy 
recipients are very similar, and we will set them equal in the estimation. We will 
allow the floors to differ, however, in some policy experiments.
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More precisely, once the Medicaid transfer is made, an individual with the state 
vector  ( h t,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t) can afford a  consumption-medical goods pair  ( c t ,  m t ) such that
(2)  u _i =  1 _____ 1 − ν  c t 1−ν + μ ( h t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t)  1 _____ 1 − ω  m t 1−ω .
To implement our utility floor, for every value of the state vector, we find the 
expenditure level  x _i =  c t +  m t q ( h t ) needed to achieve the utility level  u _i (equa-
tion (2)), assuming that individuals make intratemporally optimal decisions. This 
yields the minimum expenditure  x _c ( · ) or  x _ m ( · ) , which correspond to the cate-
gorically and medically needy floors. The actual amount that Medicaid transfers, 
 b c ( a t ,  y t ,  h t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t) or  b m ( a t ,  y t ,  h  t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t) , is then given by  x _c ( · ) or  x _ m ( · ) less the 
individual’s total financial resources (assets,  a t , and  non-asset income,  y t ).
In the standard  consumption-savings model with exogenous medical spending 
(e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995),  means-tested social insurance is typi-
cally modeled as a  government-provided consumption floor. In that framework a 
consumption floor is equivalent to a utility floor, as a lower bound on consumption 
provides a lower bound on the utility that an individual can achieve. Our utility 
floor formulation is thus a straightforward generalization of  means-tested insur-
ance from the workhorse model to the case in which people choose their medical 
expenditures.
C. Uncertainty and  Non-Asset Income
The individual faces several sources of risk, which we treat as exogenous: health 
status risk, survival risk, and medical needs risk. At the beginning of each period, 
the individual’s health status and medical needs shocks are realized, and  need-based 
transfers are determined. The individual then chooses consumption, medical expen-
diture, and savings. Finally, the survival shock hits.
Health status can take on three values: good (3), bad (2), and in a nursing home 
(1). We allow the transition probabilities for health to depend on previous health, 
sex ( g ), permanent income ( I ), and age. The elements of the health status transition 
matrix are
(3)  π j, k, g, I, t = Pr( h t+1 = k |  h t = j, g, I, t), j, k ∈ { 1, 2, 3}. 
Mortality also depends on health, sex, permanent income, and age. Let  s g, h, I, t 
denote the probability that an individual of sex  g is alive at age  t + 1 , conditional on 
being alive at age  t , having time- t health status  h , and enjoying permanent income  I .
We parameterize the preference shifter for medical goods and services (the needs 
shock) as
(4)  log (μ( · )) =  α 0 +  α 1 t +  α 2  t 2 +  α 3  t 3 +  α 4 · 1{ h t = 2} +  α 5 · 1{  h t = 2} · t
 +  α 6 · 1{ h t = 3} +  α 7 · 1{ h t = 3} · t + σ(h, t) ×  ψ t , 
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(5) σ  (h, t) 2 =  κ 0 +  κ 1 t +  κ 2  t 2 +  κ 4 · 1{ h t = 2} +  κ 5 · 1{ h t = 2} · t
 +  κ 6 · 1{ h t = 3} +  κ 7 · 1{ h t = 3} · t,  
(6)  ψ t =  ζ t +  ξ t ,  ξ t ∼ N (0,  σ ξ 2) , 
(7)  ζ t =  ρ m  ζ t−1 +  ϵ t ,  ϵ t ∼ N (0,  σ ϵ 2) , 
(8)  σ ξ 2 +   σ ϵ 
2 _____ 
1 −  ρ m 2 ≡ 1,  
where  1 {} is the indicator function that takes the value 1 when event   occurs and 
the value 0 otherwise. We allow the need for medical services to experience both 
temporary ( ξ t ) and persistent ( ζ t ) shocks, assuming that  ξ t and  ϵ t are serially and 
mutually independent. It is worth stressing that we do not allow any component of 
μ( · ) to depend on PI, which affects medical expenditures solely through the budget 
constraint.
Since  non-asset  post-retirement income,  y t , is mainly composed of social security 
and defined benefit pension income, it is not subject to shocks. For example, we found 
that negative health shocks have little effect on income changes in our AHEAD data. 
Thus, we model it as a deterministic function of sex, permanent income, and age:
(9)  y t = y(g, I, t) .
D. The Individual’s Problem
Consider a single person seeking to maximize his or her expected lifetime utility 
at age  t ,  t =  t r+1 ,… , T , where  t r is the retirement age.
To be categorically needy, a person must be eligible for SSI, by satisfying the SSI 
income and asset tests,
(10)  y t + r a t −  y d ≤  Y _ and  a t ≤  A d ,
where  a t denotes assets;  r is the real interest rate;  Y _ is the SSI income limit;  y d is the 
SSI income disregard; and  A d is the SSI asset limit and asset disregard. Note that SSI 
eligibility is based on income gross of taxes.  Low-income individuals with assets in 
excess of  A d can spend down their wealth and qualify for SSI in the future.
If a person is categorically needy and applies for SSI and Medicaid, he receives 
the SSI transfer,  Y _ − max {  y t + r a t −  y d , 0} , regardless of his health; in addition to 
determining income eligibility,  Y _ is the largest possible SSI benefit. A sick person, 
defined here as one who can not achieve the utility floor with expenditures of  Y _, 
receives additional resources in accordance with equation (2). The combined SSI/
Medicaid transfer for a categorically needy person is thus given by
(11)  b c  ( a t ,  y t , μ ( · )) =   Y _ − max {  y t + r a t −  y d , 0} + max { x _c ( · ) −  Y _, 0} ,
recalling the restrictions on  y t and  a t in equation (10).
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If the person’s total income is above  Y _ and/or his assets are above  A d , he is not 
eligible for SSI. If the person applies for Medicaid, transfers are given by
(12)   b m  ( a t ,  y t , μ ( · )) 
     = max  { x _m ( · ) −  (max {  y t + r a t −  y d , 0} + max { a t −  A d , 0}) , 0} ,
where we assume that the income disregard  y d and the asset disregard  A d are the 
same as under the categorically needy pathway.
Each period eligible individuals choose whether to receive Medicaid or not. We 
will use the indicator function  I Mt to denote this choice, with  I Mt = 1 if the person 
applies for Medicaid and  I Mt = 0 if the person does not apply.
When the person dies, any remaining assets are left to his or her heirs. We denote 
with  e the estate net of taxes. Estates are linked to assets by
  e t = e ( a t ) =  a t − max { 0, τ · ( a t −  x ̃)}. 
The parameter  τ denotes the tax rate on estates in excess of  x ̃, the estate exemption 
level. The utility the household derives from leaving the estate  e is
  ϕ(e) = θ  (e + k) _____
1 − ν 
1−ν
 ,
where  θ is the intensity of the bequest motive, while  k determines the curvature of 
the bequest function and hence the extent to which bequests are luxury goods.
Using  β to denote the discount factor, we can then write the individual’s value 
function as
(13)  V t ( a t ,  g,  h t ,  I,  ζ t ,  ξ t ) =  max  c t ,  m t ,  a t+1 ,  I Mt  {u( c t ,  m t , μ( · )) 
 + β  s g, h, I, t  E t ( V t+1 ( a t+1 , g,  h t+1 , I,  ζ t+1 ,  ξ t+1 ))
 + β(1 −  s g, h, I, t )θ  (e( a t+1 ) + k)  __________1 − ν 
1−ν
 } ,
subject to the laws of motion for the shocks and the following constraints. If  I Mt = 0 , 
i.e., the person does not apply for SSI and Medicaid,
(14)  a t+1 =  a t +  y n (r a t +  y t ) −  c t − q( h t ) m t ≥ 0,  
where the function  y n ( · ) converts  pretax to  posttax income. If  I Mt = 1 , i.e., the 
person applies for SSI and Medicaid, we have
(15)  a t+1 =  b i ( · ) +  a t +  y n (r a t +  y t ) −  c t − q( h t ) m t ≥ 0, 
(16)  a t+1 ≤ min { A d ,  a t },  
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where  b i ( · ) =  b c ( · ) if equation (10) holds, and  b i ( · ) =  b m ( · ) otherwise. 
Equations (14) and (15) both prevent the individual from borrowing against future 
income. Equation (16) forces the individual to spend at least  x _i ( · ) and to keep assets 
below the limit  A d up through the beginning of the next period.
To condense the dynamic programming problem, we can express  m t as a func-
tion of  c t by using the optimality condition implied by the intratemporal allocation 
decision. Suppose that at time  t the individual decides to spend the total  x t on con-
sumption and  out-of-pocket payments for medical goods. The optimal intratemporal 
allocation then solves
   =   1 ____ 
1 − ν  c t 1−ν + μ( · )  1 ____ 1 − ω  m t 1−ω +  λ t ( x t −  m t q(  h t ) −  c t ) ,  
where  λ t is the multiplier on the intratemporal budget constraint. The  first-order 
conditions for this problem reduce to
(17)  m t =  ( μ( · ) ____q( h t )) 
1/ω
  c t ν/ω . 
This expression can be used to eliminate  m t from the dynamic programming 
problem in equation (13), and to simplify the computation of  b i ( · ) .
IV. Estimation Procedure
Extending the approach used by De Nardi , French, and Jones (2010), we employ 
a  two-step estimation strategy. In the first step, we estimate or calibrate those param-
eters that can be cleanly identified outside our model. For example, we estimate 
mortality rates from raw demographic data. In the second step, we estimate the rest 
of the model’s parameters ( ν , ω , β ,  u _c ,  u _m , θ , k , and the parameters of  ln μ( · ) ) with 
the method of simulated moments (MSM), taking as given the parameters that were 
estimated in the first step. In particular, we find the parameter values that allow 
simulated  life-cycle decision profiles to “best match” (as measured by a GMM cri-
terion function) the profiles from the data. The moment conditions that comprise 
our estimator are:
 (i) To better evaluate the effects of Medicaid insurance, we match the fraction of 
people on Medicaid by PI quintile, five-year birth cohort and year cell (with 
the top two PI quintiles merged together).
 (ii) Because the effects of Medicaid depend directly on an individual’s asset 
holdings, we match median asset holdings by  PI-cohort-year cell.
 (iii) We match the median and ninetieth percentile of the  out-of-pocket medical 
expense distribution in each  PI-cohort-year cell (the bottom two PI quin-
tiles are merged). Because the AHEAD’s  out-of-pocket medical expense data 
are reported net of any Medicaid payments, we deduct government transfers 
from the  model-generated expenses before making any comparisons.
3496 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2016
 (iv) To capture the dynamics of medical expenses, we match the first and second 
autocorrelations for medical expenses in each  PI-cohort-year cell.
The first three sets of moment conditions are those described in Section II.6
The mechanics of our MSM approach are as follows. We compute  life-cycle 
histories for a large number of artificial individuals. Each of these individuals is 
endowed with a value of the state vector  (t,  a t , g,  h t , I ) drawn from the data distribu-
tion for 1996, and each is assigned the entire health and mortality history realized by 
the person in the AHEAD data with the same initial conditions. This way we gener-
ate attrition in our simulations that mimics precisely the attrition relationships in the 
data (including the relationship between initial wealth and mortality). The simulated 
medical needs shocks  ζ and  ξ are Monte Carlo draws from discretized versions of 
our estimated shock processes. We discretize the asset grid and, using value function 
iteration, we solve the model numerically. This yields a set of decision rules, which, 
in combination with the simulated endowments and shocks, allows us to simulate 
each individual’s net worth, medical expenditures, health, and mortality. Additional 
detail on our computational approach can be found in online Appendix B.
We then compute asset, medical expense, and Medicaid profiles from the artifi-
cial histories in the same way as we compute them from the real data. We use these 
profiles to construct moment conditions and evaluate the match using our GMM 
criterion. We search over the parameter space for the values that minimize the crite-
rion. Online Appendix C contains a detailed description of our moment conditions, 
the weighting matrix in our GMM criterion function, the asymptotic distribution of 
our parameter estimates, and the overidentification test statistic.
V.  First-Step Estimation Results
In this section, we briefly discuss the  life-cycle profiles of the stochastic variables 
used in our dynamic programming model. Using more waves of data, we update the 
procedure for estimating the income process described in De Nardi , French, and 
Jones (2010). The procedures for estimating demographic transition probabilities 
and  co-pay rates are new.
A. Income Profiles
We model  non-asset income as a function of age, sex, and the individual’s PI 
ranking. Figure 5 presents average income profiles, conditional on PI quintile, com-
puted by simulating our model. In this simulation we do not let people die, and we 
simulate each person’s financial and medical history up through the oldest surviving 
age allowed in the model. Since we rule out attrition, this picture shows how income 
evolves over time for the same sample of elderly people. Figure 5 shows that aver-
age annual income ranges from about $5,000 per year in the bottom PI quintile to 
6 As was done when constructing the figures in Section II, we drop cells with less than ten observations from 
the moment conditions. Simulated agents are endowed with asset levels drawn from the 1996 data distribution, and 
thus we only match asset data from 1998 to 2010. 
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about $23,000 in the top quintile; median wealth holdings for the two groups are 
zero and just under $200,000, respectively.
B. Mortality and Health Status
We estimate health transitions and mortality rates simultaneously by fitting the 
transitions observed in the HRS to a multinomial logit model. We allow the transi-
tion probabilities to depend on age, sex, current health status, and PI. We estimate 
annual transition rates: combining annual transition probabilities in consecu-
tive years yields  two-year transition rates we can fit to the AHEAD data. Online 
Appendix D gives details on the procedure.
Using the estimated transition probabilities, we simulate demographic histories, 
beginning at age 70, for different  gender-PI-health combinations. Table 2 shows life 
expectancies. We find that rich people, women, and healthy people live much longer 
than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. For example, a male at the tenth PI per-
centile in a nursing home expects to live only 1.7 more years, while a female at the 
ninetieth PI percentile in good health expects to live 16.2 more years.7
Another important driver of saving is the risk of needing nursing home care. 
Table 3 shows the probability at age 70 of ever entering a nursing home. The cal-
culations show that 46.0 percent of women will ultimately enter a nursing home, 
as opposed to 30.5 percent for men. These numbers are similar to those from the 
7 Our predicted life expectancy at age 70 is about 3 years less than what the aggregate statistics imply. This 
discrepancy stems from using data on singles only: when we  re-estimate the model for both couples and singles, 
predicted life expectancy is within a year of the aggregate statistics for both men and women. In addition, our esti-
mated income gradient is similar to that in Waldron (2007), who finds that those in the top of the income distribution 
live 3 years longer than those at the bottom, conditional on being 65. 
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Robinson model described in Brown and Finkelstein (2004), which show 27 percent 
of  65-year-old men and 44 percent of  65-year-old women require nursing home care.
C.  Co-Pay Rates
The  co-pay rate  q t = q( h t ) is the share of total billable medical spending not 
paid by Medicare or private insurers. Thus, it is the share paid  out-of-pocket or by 
Medicaid. We allow it to differ depending on whether the person is in a nursing 
home or not:  q t = q( h t ) .
Table 2—Life Expectancy in Years
Males Females
Permanent income Nursing Bad Good Nursing Bad Good
percentile home health health home health health Alla
10 1.7 6.0  7.5 2.5 10.0 12.0 10.4
30 1.7 6.6  8.5 2.6 11.0 13.2 11.5
50 1.7 7.3  9.5 2.7 12.0 14.3 12.5
70 1.7 8.0 10.4 2.9 13.0 15.3 13.5
90 1.8 8.8 11.3 3.0 13.9 16.2 14.4
By gender b
Men  9.7
Women 13.5
By health status c
Bad health 10.7
Good health 14.0
Notes: Conditional on reaching age 70. Life expectancies calculated through simulations using 
estimated health transition and survivor functions. 
a Using gender and health distributions for entire population.
b Using health and PI distributions for each gender.
c Using gender and PI distributions for each health status group.
Table 3—Percentage of People Ever Entering a Nursing Home
Males Females
Permanent income Bad Good Bad Good
percentile health health health health Alla
10 26.4 30.1 41.2 45.2 40.8
30 26.9 31.2 42.5 46.8 42.1
50 27.2 32.0 43.6 47.9 43.3
70 27.2 32.5 44.1 48.8 43.9
90 27.2 32.4 44.4 49.0 43.9
By gender b
Men 30.5
Women 46.0
By health status c
Bad health 39.9
Good health 44.9
Notes: Conditional on reaching age 70. Percentages calculated through simulations using esti-
mated health transition and survivor functions.
a Using gender and health distributions for entire population.
b Using health and PI distributions for each gender.
c Using gender and PI distributions for each health status group.
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Using data from the MCBS, we estimate the  co-pay rate by taking the ratio 
of mean  out-of-pocket spending plus Medicaid payments to mean total medical 
expenses. The  co-pay rate for people not in a nursing home averages 34 percent 
and does not vary much with demographics. The  co-pay rate for those in nursing 
homes is 69 percent. For every dollar spent on nursing homes, $0.34 come from 
Medicaid and $0.35 are from  out-of-pocket, with $0.31 coming from Medicare or 
other sources. We  cross-checked these  co-pay rates with data from the 1997 to 2008 
waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), again making the same 
sample selection decisions as in the AHEAD. For those not in a nursing home, the 
MCBS and MEPS estimated  co-pay rates were very similar. However, MEPS does 
not contain information on individuals in nursing homes, so we rely on the estimated 
 co-pay rates from MCBS.
VI. Second Step Results, Identification, and Model Fit
A. Parameter Values
Table 4 presents our estimated preference parameters. Our estimate of  β , the 
discount factor, is  0.994 , which suggests a high level of patience. However, in our 
model individuals discount the future not only because of impatience, but also 
because they might not survive to the next period. The effective discount factor is 
the product  β s g, h, I, t . As Table 2 shows, the survival probability for our sample of 
older individuals is low, implying an effective discount factor much lower than  β .
Our estimate of  ν , the coefficient of relative risk aversion for “regular” consump-
tion, is  2.8 , while our estimate of  ω , the coefficient of relative risk aversion for 
medical goods, is 3.0. Bajari et al. (2014) estimate the same utility function in a 
static model of health insurance choice and medical care utilization. They estimate 
ν = 1.9 and  ω = 3.2 . Thus, they also find  ν < ω , although their estimated value 
for  ν is lower than ours.8
Our estimates imply that the demand for medical goods is less elastic than the 
demand for consumption. In a recent study, Fonseca et al. (2009) calculate that 
the  co-insurance elasticity for total medical expenditures ranges from −0.27 to 
−0.35, which they find to be consistent with existing micro evidence. Repeating 
their experiment (a 150 percent increase in  co-pay rates) with our model reveals that 
elasticities range by age and income: richer and younger people have higher elastic-
ities. To calculate a summary number, we use our model of mortality and an annual 
population growth rate of 1.5 percent to find a  cross-sectional distribution of ages. 
Combining this number with our simulations, we find an aggregate  cross-sectional 
elasticity of −0.29.
The SSI income benefit (which is also the income threshold to be categorically 
needy) is estimated at $6,670, a number close to the $6,950 statutory threshold used 
in many states.
In our baseline estimates, we constrain the two utility floors to be the same, 
as Medicaid generosity does not appear to be drastically different across the two 
8 Einav et al. (2013) and McClellan and Skinner (2006) also study  two-period problems where utility depends 
on medical care. 
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 categories of recipients. The utility floor corresponds to the utility from consuming 
$4,600 a year when healthy. It should be noted that the medically needy are guaran-
teed a minimum income of $6,670 ($7,270 including the income disregard) so that 
their total consumption when healthy is at least $7,270 a year. However, when there 
are large medical needs, transfers are determined by the  Medicaid-induced utility 
floor.
The point estimates of  θ and  k imply that, in the period before certain death, the 
bequest motive becomes operative once consumption exceeds $3,500 per year (see 
De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010 for a derivation). For individuals in this group, 
the marginal propensity to bequeath, above the threshold level, is $0.78 out of every 
additional dollar. Several other authors have recently estimated bequest motives 
inside structural models of old age saving.9 Imposing a linear bequest motive, 
Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) find that agents with bequest motives (around three 
quarters of the population) would, when facing certain death, bequeath all wealth in 
excess of $29,700. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) find that, depending on the 
specification, the bequest motive becomes active between $31,500 and $43,000, and 
generates a marginal propensity to bequeath of 88 to 89 percent. Lockwood (2014) 
finds a threshold of $18,400 and a propensity to bequeath of 92 percent. While these 
studies suggest bequests are more of a luxury good than do our estimates, none of 
them seek to explain Medicaid usage. In contrast, Ameriks et al. (2011) estimate 
their model using survey data questions, including hypothetical questions about 
bequests and  long-term care insurance, in a model aimed at assessing Medicaid and 
medical expense risk. They find a terminal bequest threshold of $7,100 and a pro-
pensity to bequeath of 98 percent. Compared to them, we find a lower threshold but 
a much higher marginal propensity to consume.
9 Assembling these values requires a few derivations and inflation adjustments. Calculations are available on 
request. 
Table 4—Estimated Preference Parameters
 β : discount factor 0.994
(0.013)
 ν : RRA, consumption 2.83(0.03)
 ω : RRA, medical expenditures 2.99(0.03)
 Y _: SSI income level $6,670(208)
 u _c =  u _m : utility floor $4,600(144)
 θ : bequest intensity 39.7(2.5)
 k : bequest curvature (in 000s) 13.0(0.7)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The utility floor is 
indexed by the consumption level that provides the floor 
when  μ = 0 .
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We now turn to discussing the identification of the model’s parameters and how 
well the model fits some key aspects of the data, and to highlighting some of the 
model’s implications for medical and  nonmedical spending at older ages.
B. Parameter Identification
The preference parameters are identified jointly. There are multiple ways to gen-
erate high saving by the elderly: large values of the discount factor  β , low values 
of the utility floors  u _c and  u _m , large values of the curvature parameters  ν and  ω , 
or strong and pervasive bequest motives (high values of  θ and small values of  k ). 
Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002) point out that the same assets can simultane-
ously address both precautionary and bequest motives. Likewise, there are multiple 
ways to ensure that the  income-poorest elderly do not save, including high utility 
floors and bequest motives that become operative only at high levels of consump-
tion. All of these mechanics are documented in more detail in online Appendix E, 
which shows how changing individual parameters, one at a time, affects the com-
ponents of our GMM criterion and the  life-cycle profiles of several key variables.
We acquire additional identification in several ways. We require our model to 
match the fraction of people on Medicaid by PI, cohort, and age, which helps pin 
down the utility floors and the SSI threshold  Y _. To match the observed Medicaid 
recipiency rates, the Medicaid insurance floors have to be substantial, in excess 
of $4,600 of consumption by the healthy. A lower floor would generate too few 
people on Medicaid, especially at higher PI quintiles: Table E1 in online Appendix 
E shows that lowering the utility floor significantly worsens the model’s fit of its 
Medicaid recipiency targets. By way of comparison, the model with endogenous 
medical expenses in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), the one most comparable 
with the model in this paper, is not estimated to match Medicaid recipiency rates. 
That model fits the asset data using a similar value of  β , no bequest motives, and 
low utility floors. A similar specification matches the asset data very well even 
with our current, richer model of the Medicaid program; the combination in fact 
matches the asset data better than our baseline estimates. However, the Medicaid 
program implied by those estimates is too stingy to generate the Medicaid recip-
iency rates observed in the data, and a more generous Medicaid program reduces 
the need to accumulate assets. To match the same asset profiles under the more 
generous insurance system we need a higher discount factor and/or a stronger 
bequest motive. Because we restrict  β to lie between 0.96 and 1.0, this implies a 
strong bequest motive.
Disentangling  β and the bequest motive parameters is tricky. A key insight is that 
a higher value of  β will lead both assets and medical spending to increase more rap-
idly over the life cycle, while stronger bequest motives will lead assets to increase 
more rapidly without a corresponding increase in medical spending. Requiring the 
model to match both asset and medical spending moments thus helps us distinguish 
patience from bequest motives. The intuition just described is incomplete because 
the medical needs shifter  μ( h t ,  ζ t ,  ξ t , t) is also estimated to match the  life-cycle 
profiles of  out-of-pocket medical spending. However, the medical needs shifter 
is not allowed to vary by cohort or permanent income, even though our moments 
vary along these very dimensions. Much of the variation along these dimensions 
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instead comes from endogenous decisions over saving and total medical spending, 
both of which depend on the discount factor and the bequest motive. For instance, 
 low-permanent-income people are just as patient as richer ones, and yet they choose 
not to save, leading to low assets and  out-of-pocket medical spending (because of 
Medicaid). Thus, our model is identified in many ways, because it generates hetero-
geneous responses to similar shocks. For example, it is in large part identified by 
differences in the slopes of the asset and medical expense (and Medicaid recipiency) 
profiles across permanent income quintiles and cohorts.
The coefficients of relative risk aversion for  nonmedical and medical goods,  ν 
and  ω , also must generate reasonable asset trajectories. As shown in online 
Appendix  E, reducing either parameter leads households to deplete their wealth 
more quickly by reducing their desire to smooth consumption. Further identification 
comes from the income gradient of medical expenditures. In particular, dividing 
both sides of equation (17) by consumption provides an equation for the optimal 
ratio of medical to  nonmedical expenditures:
(18)   m t  __ c t  =  ( μ( · ) ____q( h t )) 
1/ω
  c t  ν−ω ____ω  . 
This ratio depends on the relative sizes of the coefficients  ω and  ν . As resources 
(and thus consumption) rise,   m t  __ c t  will decrease when people are more risk averse over 
medical goods than over  nonmedical goods ( ω > ν ). Put differently, people with 
higher wealth and permanent income spend a smaller share of their resources on 
medical goods than on consumption goods when  ω > ν . Our estimates suggest this 
is the empirically relevant case. Figures 2, 3, and 5 show that prior to age 90, the 
rate at which medical expenditures increase across the permanent income quintiles 
is smaller than the rate of increase for annual income. It follows that the share of 
total expenditures devoted to medical expenditures is falling in total expenditures, 
and thus  ω > ν . Online Appendix E shows that the two parameters are tightly iden-
tified. Reducing either  ν or  ω by 10 percent leads to large changes in both our GMM 
criteria and in the age profiles of assets, Medicaid recipiency, and the consumption 
of  nonmedical goods and medical goods and services.
We also estimate the components of the logged medical needs shifter  μ( h t ,  ψ t , t) . 
These include the level parameters (the  α s in equation (4)), the volatility parame-
ters (the  κ s in equation (5)), and the process for the shocks  ζ t and  ξ t . The estimates, 
along with standard errors, can be found in online Appendix F. The level parameters 
and the volatility parameters are identified by the median and ninetieth percentile 
of  out-of-pocket medical spending. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, both spending 
statistics rise rapidly with age. The last two lines in online Appendix Table E1 show 
the effects of first reducing the average of the medical needs shocks by 10 percent 
and then reducing their variance by 10 percent. Both changes worsen the fit of med-
ical spending, but the first change also significantly worsens the fit of the Medicaid 
recipiency moments, showing that they too help identify  μ( · ) . The processes for  ζ t 
and  ξ t are identified by the first and second autocorrelations of  out-of-pocket spend-
ing. Consistent with our findings, French and Jones (2004) find that, in the AHEAD 
data, the autocorrelation of medical spending at one lag is 0.4, but that autocorrela-
tions at longer lags decline very slowly. They show that such a pattern implies that 
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the transitory shock  ξ t has a relatively large variance and that the persistent shock  ζ t 
has a large autocorrelation parameter ( ρ m ).
C. Model Fit
In our  second-step we estimate 24 parameters—7 preference parameters and 17 
parameters related to the medical needs shifter—to match 633 moments. The asso-
ciated overidentification test statistic has a value of 1,799, implying that the model 
is formally rejected. Nonetheless, the model does a good job of matching its data 
targets, and matches other features of the data as well.
Figure 6 compares the Medicaid recipiency profiles generated by the model 
(dashed line) to those in the data (solid line) for the members of four  birth-year 
cohorts. In panel A, the lines at the far left of the graph are for the youngest cohort, 
whose members in 1996 were aged 72 to 76, with an average age of 74. The second 
set of lines are for the cohort aged 82 to 86 in 1996. Panel B displays the two other 
cohorts, starting at ages 79 and 89, respectively. For clarity, for each cohort we show 
profiles for the bottom, third and top PI quintiles. The graphs show that the model 
matches the general patterns of Medicaid usage. The model tends to  overpredict 
usage by the poor, especially at older ages, and to underpredict usage by the rich, 
especially at younger ages. This may reflect heterogeneity along such dimensions as 
quality of care, or attitudes toward Medicaid, that are not captured in our parsimo-
nious model of Medicaid.
Figure 7 plots median net worth by age, cohort, and PI. Here too the model does 
well, matching the way in which savings patterns differ by PI, including the ten-
dency of  higher-PI people to not run down their assets until well past age 90.
Although the model is required only to match median assets, conditional on 
income quintile, cohort, and age, it also matches reasonably well the unconditional 
 cross-sectional distribution of assets. Figure 8 compares the cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDFs) of assets both in the AHEAD data (solid line) and in the 
Figure 6. Medicaid Recipiency: Data versus Model
Notes: Each line represents Medicaid recipiency for a cohort-PI cell, traced over the time period 1996–2010: data 
(solid lines) and model (dashed lines). For each cohort we show profiles for the bottom, third, and top PI quintiles. 
Thicker lines refer to higher PI groups. Panel A: cohorts aged 74 and 84 in 1996. Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 89 
in 1996.
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model  simulations (dotted line).10 Overall, the model provides a good fit of the 
 cross-sectional distribution. The model modestly underpredicts the probability 
of low assets. For example, 47 percent of AHEAD households have assets below 
$30,000, whereas the model predicts that 41 percent of households have assets below 
$30,000. At higher asset levels the model’s fit improves. For example, 67 percent of 
10 The CDF for  model-predicted assets is a step function because we discretize the asset grid. 
Figure 7. Median Net Worth: Data versus Model
Notes: Each line represents median net worth for a cohort-PI cell, traced over the time period 1996–2010: data 
(solid lines) and model (dashed lines). For each cohort we show profiles for the bottom, third, and top PI quintiles. 
Thicker lines refer to higher PI groups. Panel A: cohorts aged 74 and 84 in 1996. Panel B: cohorts aged 79 and 89 
in 1996.
Figure 8. Cumulative Distribution Functions of Assets
Note: Model (solid line), AHEAD data (dotted line)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 30 100 300 1,000
Assets (thousands of 1998 dollars)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Age
70
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
74 78 82 86 90 94 98 102
Age
70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 102
Panel A. Cohorts aged 74 and 84:
data (solid) versus model (dashed)
Panel B. Cohorts aged 79 and 89:
data (solid) versus model (dashed)
A
ss
et
s 
(00
0s
 o
f 2
00
5 
do
lla
rs
) 
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
A
ss
et
s 
(00
0s
 o
f 2
00
5 
do
lla
rs
) 
3505DE NARDI ET AL.: MEDICAID INSURANCE IN OLD AGEVOL. 106 NO. 11
AHEAD households have assets below $100,000, whereas the model predicts that 
66 percent of households have assets below $100,000.
Figure 9 displays the median and ninetieth percentile of  out-of-pocket medical 
expenses paid by people in the model and in the data. Permanent income has a large 
effect on  out-of-pocket medical expenses, especially at older ages. Median medical 
expenses are about $2,000 a year at age 75. By age 100, they stay flat for those in 
the bottom quintile of the PI distribution but often exceed $5,000 for those at the top 
of the PI distribution. Panels A and B show that the model does a reasonable job of 
matching the medians found in the data. The other two panels report the ninetieth 
percentile of  out-of-pocket medical expenses in the model and in the data, and thus 
provide a better idea of the tail risk by age and PI. Here the model reproduces the 
way in which the medical expenditures of  lower-PI people tend to stay flat over the 
life cycle, but it tends to understate the medical expenditures of  high-PI people in 
their late nineties.
Turning to the  cross-sectional distribution of medical spending, Figure 10 pres-
ents three panels. Panel A, in the top left corner, presents the CDFs of  out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures found in the AHEAD and MCBS data, as well as that 
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Figure 9. Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures by Cohort and Income
Notes: Each line represents the median (top panels) or ninetieth percentile (bottom panels) of medical expenditures 
for a cohort-PI cell, traced over 1996–2010: data (solid lines) and model (dashed lines). Left versus right panels: 
different cohorts. For each cohort we show profiles for the bottom, third, and top PI quintiles. Thicker lines refer 
to higher PI groups.
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 produced by the model. The solid line in the figure is the  model-predicted CDF, the 
dashed line is the AHEAD CDF, and the dotted line is the MCBS CDF. Because the 
model’s parameters are estimated in part by fitting AHEAD  out-of-pocket spend-
ing profiles—although not the CDF itself—it is not surprising that AHEAD and 
 model-predicted CDFs are very similar. The  model-predicted ninetieth percentile 
of  out-of-pocket spending is greater than what is observed in the AHEAD data, 
although it is very close to what is observed in the MCBS.
Panel B shows the CDF of Medicaid payments, both as predicted by the model 
and in the MCBS data. Medicaid expenditures in the MCBS data are higher than 
those predicted by the model up to the ninety-eighth percentile, but are lower there-
after. Panel C, at the bottom, shows the CDF of total medical expenditures from 
all payers. Total expenditures in the MCBS are higher than the model predictions 
up to the eighty-sixth percentile at $43,000, and are lower thereafter. In summary, 
these differences are not large and the model fits the distribution  of out-of-pocket, 
Medicaid, and total medical spending well. Because Medicaid and total medical 
expenditures are not part of the GMM criterion we use to estimate the model, the 
ability of the model to fit these data provides additional validation. This feature is 
important for policy analysis, as it means the model is able to match the risk of cat-
astrophic medical spending.
Figure 10. Cumulative Distribution Functions of Medical Spending: Data versus Model
Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of medical spending: model (solid line), AHEAD data (long dashed line, 
panel A only), and MCBS (short dashed line). Panel A: Out-of-pocket expenditures. Panel B: Medicaid expendi-
tures. Panel C: Total expenditures.
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Table 5 shows average Medicaid and  out-of-pocket expenditures for each PI 
quintile, both as predicted by the model and as in the data. The first two columns 
of Table 5 compare Medicaid expenditures in the MCBS data to those predicted by 
the model. It shows that retirees at the bottom of the PI distribution have average 
Medicaid expenditures of $9,080 and $10,070 in the data and model, respectively. 
For those at the top of the PI distribution, Medicaid expenditures are $1,280 and 
$2,250 in data and model, respectively. It bears noting that the Medicaid payments 
reported in the MCBS are on average smaller than those reported in the administra-
tive records: De Nardi et al. (2015) find the administrative payments to be 24 per-
cent higher. Keeping this in mind, Table 5 shows that the model matches Medicaid 
payments fairly well.
As shown in Table 1, although average Medicaid payments in the MCBS are 
smaller at the top of the PI distribution, conditional on receiving Medicaid those at 
the top of the PI distribution receive much larger payments. This is also true in the 
model.
The last three columns of Table 5 compare  out-of-pocket expenditures from the 
MCBS, the AHEAD, and the model. The MCBS data show a less steep PI gradi-
ent than the AHEAD data or the model. Those at the bottom of the PI distribution 
spend $4,050 in the MCBS data and $2,550 in the AHEAD data, while expendi-
tures at the top are $8,020 in the MCBS versus $7,000 in the AHEAD. Overall, 
however, the gradients are similar. This similarity in average  out-of-pocket expen-
ditures gives us confidence that our facts are robust across datasets. The final 
column shows the average  out-of-pocket expenditures predicted by the model. 
Overall, the model fits the data well for both  out-of-pocket and Medicaid expen-
ditures. Because we do not allow the medical needs shocks to vary with gender, 
due to sample limitations, the model  over-predicts spending by men. De Nardi, 
French, and Jones (2010), who assume medical expenditures are exogenous, find 
that conditional on age, health, and PI, the  out-of-pocket medical expenses of men 
are significantly lower than the expenses of women. Details on the construction of 
these  cross-sectional comparisons, and additional comparisons, can be found in 
online Appendix A.
Table 5—Average Medicaid Payments and Out-of-Pocket Expenditures:  
Data versus Model
Medicaid payments Out-of-pocket expenses
Permanent income MCBS MCBS AHEAD
quintile data Model data data Model
Bottom 9,080 10,070 4,050 2,550 2,210
Fourth 5,720 7,960 5,340 4,270 3,800
Third 2,850 6,000 6,470 5,050 6,330
Second 1,950 3,910 7,300 6,360 8,500
Top 1,280 2,250 8,020 7,000 10,600
Men 2,850 3,780 5,440 4,760 8,280
Women 4,410 5,980 6,470 5,230 6,420
Note: Average Medicaid payments and out-of-pocket medical expenditures (2005 dollars), 
model, MCBS data, and AHEAD data, 1996–2010, for all individuals 72 and older in 1996.
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D. Medical and  Nonmedical Spending in Old Age: Present Discounted Values
To assess the effects of Medicaid from a lifetime perspective, we simulate 
extended life histories for the youngest cohort. Each simulated individual receives 
a value of the state vector  (t,  a t , g,  h t , I ) drawn from the empirical distribution of 
72- to  76-year-olds in 1996. He or she then receives a series of health, medical 
expense, and mortality shocks consistent with the stochastic processes described 
in the model section, and is tracked to (potentially) age 100. Figure 11 uses these 
simulations to show the model’s implications for  nonmedical consumption, show-
ing the trajectory of average consumption for each PI quintile. In contrast to med-
ical expenditures, which rise rapidly with age, average  nonmedical consumption 
expenditures decline, albeit slightly, over retirement. This pattern is quite similar 
to the spending profiles found in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (see, e.g., 
Banks et al. 2015).
After simulating life histories, we convert the expenditure streams into present dis-
counted values, using the model’s assumed  pretax interest rate of 4 percent. Table 6 
shows the present discounted value of both  nonmedical and medical consumption 
as of age 74. Table 6 reveals that the consumption of medical goods and services 
is large relative to the consumption of  nonmedical goods at all PI levels. However, 
 nonmedical consumption rises more quickly in PI than total medical spending, as 
ν < ω .  Nonmedical spending for the poorest is 25 percent of  nonmedical spend-
ing for the richest. In contrast, the total medical spending of the bottom PI quintile 
is nearly 50 percent of the total medical spending of the top quintile. In fact, for 
low-PI individuals, the present discounted value of total medical spending exceeds 
the present discounted value of  nonmedical consumption; for high-PI individuals, 
the opposite is true.
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The final column of Table 6 shows that  out-of-pocket medical expenses rise in 
PI even more quickly. This is because Medicaid covers a higher share of medi-
cal expenses for the poor. Over their lifetime, the  out-of-pocket costs of medical 
goods and services for the  income-richest are over 7 times as large as those of the 
 income-poorest. The table also shows that the present discounted value of all spend-
ing, medical and  nonmedical, is larger for women than men, as they tend to live 
almost 4 years longer. Furthermore, those initially in good health also tend to spend 
more, as they tend to have longer lives and higher PI.
VII. Medicaid Benefits, Taxes, and Valuations
A. Medicaid Benefits Received and Taxes Paid
The first column of Table 7 shows the present discounted value of Medicaid ben-
efits, beginning at age 74. Although the payments decrease by PI quintile, they are 
 nontrivial for all PI groups. For instance, those in the highest-PI quintile expect to 
receive $8,800, which is about 40 percent of their yearly income. Although the poor 
Table 6—Present Discounted Value of Nonmedical Consumption and Consumption 
of Medical Goods and Services at Age 74
Medical goods and services
Permanent income quintile Nonmedical consumption Total Out-of-pocket
Bottom 59,200 108,300 11,200
Fourth 79,700 121,100 20,400
Third 106,800 139,500 35,100
Second 163,900 178,800 55,200
Top 234,900 229,700 80,600
Men 136,000 133,900 42,700
Women 143,800 172,200 46,300
Good health 173,200 182,200 54,300
Bad health 97,500 144,000 33,000
Table 7—Present Discounted Value of Medicaid Payments Received  
and Taxes Paid
Permanent income quintile Medicaid payments Medicaid taxes Taxes/payments
Bottom 33,600 6,700 0.20
Fourth 29,400 8,600 0.29
Third 20,400 20,600 1.01
Second 15,100 30,300 2.00
Top 8,800 40,200 4.59
Men 8,600 28,800 3.34
Women 22,400 20,000 0.89
Good health 17,800 26,400 1.48
Bad health 23,700 12,500 0.53
Note: Present discounted value of Medicaid payments received (simulated from the model), 
Medicaid taxes paid (computed from the PSID), and the ratio of Medicaid taxes to Medicaid 
payments, all from the standpoint of age 74.
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are more likely to receive Medicaid, even the rich are sometimes impoverished by 
expensive medical conditions, making them eligible for Medicaid benefits too.
These flows reinforce the view that middle- and  higher-income people also ben-
efit from Medicaid transfers in old age. Women receive more Medicaid transfers 
than men, both because they live longer and because they tend to be poorer. Finally, 
those in good health at age 74 receive almost as much as those in bad health at 74, 
because they tend to live long enough to require costly procedures and long nursing 
home stays.
The middle column of Table 7 calculates the present discounted value at age 74 
of the taxes paid to finance Medicaid transfers over all of one’s life, including the 
working period. Since we do not explicitly model the working period, to calculate 
Medicaid tax payments, we modify the approach found in McClellan and Skinner 
(2006), who calculate tax payments for Medicare. We first use data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to calculate the lifetime taxes paid by different 
groups. Because Medicaid has no dedicated funding source, we assume that it is 
financed by a tax schedule that is proportional to total tax payments, and that the 
average Medicaid tax rate in this progressive tax schedule balances the Medicaid 
budget for this cohort.11 See online Appendix G for more details.
We use the PSID because it includes income from spouses who have died before 
the AHEAD sample begins. A large share of our sample consists of elderly widows. 
To capture the progressivity of the taxes they paid when young, we need a data source 
that includes income from their deceased husbands. Because high-income women 
tend to marry high-income men, ignoring the income and taxes paid by husbands 
would understate the taxes paid by  higher-income widows relative to  lower-income 
people, who might have been not married or married with  lower-earning spouses. 
Although the AHEAD has tax records from working years, information on taxes 
paid by deceased spouses is incomplete.
Those in the top PI quintile pay on average $40,200 in taxes toward Medicaid, 
6  times as much as those in the bottom of the PI distribution. This reflects both 
higher income and higher marginal tax rates. As a result, those at the top of the PI 
distribution pay in much more than they receive in Medicaid payments. The right 
most column of Table 7 shows the ratio of taxes paid to transfers received. Those 
at the top of the distribution pay on average $4.59 in taxes for every $1 of transfers 
received, whereas those at the bottom of the distribution pay $0.20 for every $1 of 
transfers.
B. Household Valuations of Medicaid
In this section, we simulate changes in Medicaid generosity and compare the 
resulting increases (or decreases) in government costs to the resulting gains (or 
losses) in consumer welfare.
To measure the costs of a Medicaid reform we compute by how much the pres-
ent discounted value of Medicaid payments changes when the program changes, 
assuming that providing an additional $1 of Medicaid “transfers” would cost the 
11 Because of distortions, the social costs of funding Medicaid likely exceed the tax totals reported in Table 7. 
As surveyed by Dahlby (2008), the range of estimates for the marginal social cost of funds is large. 
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government exactly $1. This is a natural benchmark, but one should keep in mind 
that the government can make Medicaid more or less attractive to its recipients in 
many ways beyond direct changes in transfers.
If Medicaid provides retirees with valuable insurance, the compensating variation 
may exceed the change in the actuarial value of Medicaid payments. On the other 
hand, people may value the transfer flows at less than their actuarial value. For 
example, if they are very impatient, they might prefer having the cash today, to dis-
pose of as they wish, over receiving Medicaid transfers in the future. Furthermore, 
assets are taxed at 100 percent for those receiving Medicaid transfers, because of 
asset testing, which in turn distorts savings decisions.
To measure the welfare gains we compute the compensating variation; that is, the 
immediate payment after the Medicaid reform that would leave the retiree as well 
off as before the reform. This is an  ex ante measure. More specifically, the compen-
sating variation at age 74,  λ 74 = λ( a 74 , g,  h 74 , I,  ζ 74 ,  ξ 74 ) , is computed as
    V 74 ( a 74 , g,  h 74 , I,  ζ 74 ,  ξ 74 ; current Medicaid)  
    =  V t ( a 74 +  λ 74 , g,  h 74 , I,  ζ 74 ,  ξ 74 ; Medicaid reform) ,
where  V 74 ( a 74 , g,  h 74 , I,  ζ 74 ,  ξ 74 ; · ) is the value function evaluated at a given set of 
state variables, either in the world with current Medicaid (the  left-hand side of the 
equation above) or in a world with a reformed Medicaid program. Our measure is 
similar to the ones computed for Medicare by Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) and 
McClellan and Skinner (2006) but uses a  forward-looking value function, rather 
than a static utility function. When considering a group, we simply take averages 
across all its members.
To distinguish the insurance provided by the categorically and the medically 
needy programs, we first analyze a 10 percent decrease in the categorically needy 
utility floor. This corresponds to the consumption of the categorically needy when 
healthy dropping from $4,610 to $4,140. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show that this 
change only affects people in the bottom two PI quintiles, as people with higher 
incomes never qualify as categorically needy. The discounted present value of 
Medicaid payments drops by $4,100 and $2,100, respectively, for people in the two 
bottom PI quintiles. Column 2 reports the compensating variation.
Column 3 presents the ratio of column 2 to column 1, and reveals that the cate-
gorically needy people value their lost Medicaid insurance at more than the cost of 
providing it. However, the ratio is not very large, suggesting that the insurance value 
of these transfers, at the margin, is not very large. Nonetheless, because this group 
pays only a small fraction of the transfer’s cost (see Table 7), the value they place on 
their Medicaid benefits almost surely exceeds their associated tax burden.
We next cut the consumption value of both utility floors (that is, both the categor-
ically and medically needy floors) by 10 percent and simulate our model again. The 
 right-hand side panel of Table 8 shows the resulting reductions in Medicaid pay-
ments and their compensating variations. A striking feature of this table is that while 
people in the lowest three PI quintiles value Medicaid fairly close to its cost, people 
in the top two PI quintiles value Medicaid at two to three times its cost. In fact, the 
compensating variation for retirees in the top PI quintile, $4,400, is as big as that 
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of the middle quintile, and is  two-thirds as big as the compensating variation at the 
bottom. The insurance value of Medicaid is very high for these people because of 
two reasons. First, because these people are  high-income, they have a high lifetime 
level of consumption and thus have more consumption to lose should it fall. Second, 
they face the double compounded risk of living well past their life expectancy and 
facing extremely high medical needs. It is in those states of the world that insurance 
is most valuable.12 Offsetting these insurance gains, however, is a redistributive tax 
system. While individuals in the top income quintile place a value of $3.14 on each 
dollar of transfers, they pay $4.59 of taxes (Table 7).
In Table 9, we analyze the benefits of making the Medicaid program more gen-
erous by increasing the Medicaid consumption floor by 10 percent (from $4,610 
to $5,070). Table 9 shows that people at the bottom two PI quintiles value these 
Medicaid increases at less than their cost, people in the next two quintiles value 
them at slightly above cost, and people in the top quintile value them at twice their 
cost. Once again, as income increases, the insurance value of Medicaid, as opposed 
to its actuarial value, increases in importance. In the aggregate, taking averages over 
all retirees reveals that the cost increase associated with a more generous Medicaid 
program slightly exceeds the average valuation. Comparing the valuations to the 
associated tax burdens (see Table 7), however, produces different implications. 
Even though  high-income retirees would receive the most “ bang per buck” from 
a Medicaid expansion ($2.00 per dollar of transfers), under the current redistribu-
tive tax system they would not support it, as their tax burden would rise (by $4.59 
per dollar of transfers) more than their valuation. In contrast,  low-income retirees, 
who receive the least bang per buck from a Medicaid expansion, would support the 
12 Online Appendix H reports compensating variations under different Medicaid rules and shows that our esti-
mates are robust to reasonable changes in the rules. 
Table 8—The Costs and Benefits of Cutting Medicaid by 10 Percent
Categorical floor down 10 percent Both floors down 10 percent
Reduction Reduction
in PDV of Compensating Ratio of in PDV of Compensating Ratio of
Permanent payments variation (2)/(1) payments variation (5)/(4)
income quintile (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
Bottom 4,100 5,600 1.37 4,500 6,300 1.40
Fourth 2,100 2,200 1.05 4,000 5,000 1.25
Third 0.0 0.0 N/A 2,900 4,400 1.52
Second 0.0 0.0 N/A 2,200 4,100 1.86
Top 0.0 0.0 N/A 1,400 4,400 3.14
Men 300 200 0.67 1,300 1,100 0.85
Women 1,200 1,600 1.33 3,100 5,600 1.81
Good health 700 900 1.29 2,600 4,800 1.85
Bad health 1,700 2,200 1.29 3,300 5,000 1.52
Notes: Left panel: the categorically needy floor is cut by 10 percent. Right panel: both Medicaid floors are cut 
by 10 percent. Columns 1 and 4: decrease in the present discounted value of Medicaid payments as of age 74. 
Columns 2 and 5: dollar amount needed to compensate people for the Medicaid benefit cut. Columns 3 and 6: ratio 
of column 2 to column 1 and column 5 to column 4, respectively, which give the average compensating variation 
per dollar of reduced Medicaid benefits.
3513DE NARDI ET AL.: MEDICAID INSURANCE IN OLD AGEVOL. 106 NO. 11
expansion, as their tax burden would rise by even less. Only people in the middle 
quintile value a Medicaid expansion in excess of both its cost and their tax burden.
Put together, the results in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that under current program 
rules people value Medicaid transfers at more than their actuarial cost, but that 
increasing Medicaid’s generosity would raise its insurance value by less than its 
cost. Our model therefore suggests that the current Medicaid system is about the 
right size for most currently retired singles.
C.  Long-Term Care Insurance
While our model includes endogenous medical spending and several dimen-
sions of  individual-level heterogeneity, it abstracts from the decision to purchase 
 long-term care insurance (LTCI). Only about 9 percent of elderly singles have LTCI 
(Lockwood 2014), and only 4 percent of LTC expenditures are paid for by LTCI 
(Congressional Budget Office 2004). Given that our results suggest that the elderly, 
and especially the high-income elderly, value Medicaid insurance heavily, it is puz-
zling that the market for LCTI is so small.
Brown and Finkelstein argue that one major reason that the LTCI market is so 
small is that Medicaid crowds out LTCI and thus that major reductions in Medicaid 
would increase LTCI use. This is due to the fact that Medicaid is a payer of last 
resort and is subject to asset and income tests, which implies that LTCI payments for 
nursing home care would often crowd out Medicaid payments for the same services.
If there are fixed costs to acquiring/providing or discarding LTCI, larger changes 
in Medicaid generosity are more likely to induce changes in LTCI holdings than 
small changes in generosity. Our experiments thus involve relatively small changes 
to the Medicaid program, which imply smaller incentives to change LTCI positions. 
But even in the absence of transaction costs, there are other important reasons why 
Table 9—The Costs and Benefits of Increasing Medicaid by 10 Percent
Both floors up 10 percent
Payment Compensating Ratio
increase variation (2)/(1)
Permanent income quintile (1) (2) (3) 
Bottom 4,700 2,600 0.55
Fourth 4,200 3,100 0.74
Third 3,100 3,600 1.16
Second 2,300 2,900 1.26
Top 1,300 2,600 2.00
Men 1,400 600 0.43
Women 3,300 3,500 1.06
Good health 2,500 3,000 1.20
Bad health 3,500 3,000 0.86
Notes: Column 1: increase in the present discounted value of Medicaid payments at age 74. 
Column 2: dollar amount people would be willing to pay to receive the higher Medicaid ben-
efits. Column 3 is the ratio of column 2 to column 1, which show the average compensating 
variation per dollar of reduced Medicaid benefits.
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LTCI use is limited and why it would likely stay limited even if Medicaid generosity 
was reduced by a reasonable amount. These factors include:
 (i) Lack of efficiency in the private market for  long-term care insurance. Prices 
are high: Brown and Finkelstein (2008) report that imperfect competition 
and transaction costs result in prices that are marked up substantially above 
expected claims, with loads on typical policies from $0.18 to $0.51 on the 
dollar, depending on whether one takes into account lapsed policies. These 
loads are much higher than loads that have been estimated in other private 
insurance markets and point to the existence of one or more supply side 
imperfections.
 (ii) Limited insurance against nursing home risk. Brown and Finkelstein (2009) 
report that comprehensive LTCI contracts exist but are not purchased. The 
typical LTCI contracts held by households cap both the maximum number of 
days covered over the life of the policy and the maximum daily payment for a 
nursing home stay, a daily payment that is often fixed in nominal terms (Fang 
2014). Even the policies that provide some kind of indexation of the daily 
maximum payment are typically linked to aggregate price indexes rather than 
actual nursing home costs, thus generating substantial purchasing power risk 
between the time a person purchases the policy and the time she enters a 
nursing home. As a result, most available policies do not provide insurance 
against tail risk, which is exactly the risk that the richest in our model fear the 
most, due to longer longevity and higher risk of large medical needs when 
very old.
 (iii) Severe adverse selection. Hendren (2013) shows that when private information 
problems are sufficiently large within certain subgroups, insurance markets 
fail to emerge. His main empirical findings are that a large fraction of those 
applying for insurance are rejected by underwriters, and that those who are 
rejected hold significant private information. He also finds that 23 percent of 
65-year-olds have health conditions that preclude them from purchasing LTCI.
 (iv) Bequest motives. In a framework with exogenous medical spending, 
Lockwood (2014) argues that reasonably estimated bequest motives, together 
with medical expense risk, help explain the patterns of asset decumulation 
and (low) LTCI purchases seen in the data. We also estimate a significant 
bequest motive, which reduces the value of LTCI.
D. Unpacking the Results: Moral Hazard and Exogenous Expenditures
An important open question is the extent to which people impoverish themselves 
in order to qualify for Medicaid. Because our model includes savings and medical 
spending choices, it is well suited to address the quantitative importance of this form of 
moral hazard. Moral hazard arises within our model both contemporaneously, in that 
retirees may purchase too much subsidized health care, and  dynamically, in that people 
might be  over-spending over a number of periods to qualify for Medicaid in the future. 
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To better understand the quantitative importance of moral hazard, we analyze further 
the 10 percent cut in Medicaid generosity considered in columns 4–6 of Table 8.
The cut in Medicaid generosity has two effects. First, it mechanically reduces eli-
gibility and transfers at any given level of individual resources. Second, it changes 
the degree of moral hazard by changing the incentives to consume and save. To 
help disentangle these effects, we assess whether the benefit cut significantly affects 
medical and  nonmedical spending and thus savings. Table 10 shows total and 
 out-of-pocket medical spending,  nonmedical spending, and Medicaid recipiency 
rates at age 85 for the simulated life histories used to construct Table 8. The top 
panel of Table 10 shows quantities for the estimated baseline model, while the sec-
ond panel shows the quantities after a 10 percent reduction in the Medicaid utility 
floor. The bottom two panels show the differences between the two cases, in abso-
lute and then relative (percentage) terms. Table 10 shows that a 10 percent Medicaid 
cut would lead  nonmedical spending for 85-year-olds in the bottom PI quintile to 
fall by $290, and their  out-of-pocket medical spending to rise by $150. Savings 
thus rise by $140, a response that is modest relative to the decline in total medical 
spending of $1,790. The changes in the other PI quintiles are similar, albeit smaller. 
These findings indicate that the mechanical effects of changing Medicaid are larger 
than the moral hazard effects.13
13 Using data from a large  self-insured employer, Bajari et al. (2014) find significant moral hazard. They focus 
on how changes in the  co-insurance rate  q changes the allocation of medical versus  nonmedical spending, but do 
Table 10—The Effects of Decreasing Medicaid Payments by 10 Percent, Age 85
Medical expenditures
Medicaid
Permanent income Consumption Total OOP recipiency (percent)
Baseline
 Bottom 7,890 22,110 1,430 89.1
 Fourth 9,810 21,280 2,860 42.9
 Third 12,380 22,710 5,310 9.9
 Second 18,520 25,630 8,210 3.7
 Top 26,330 32,790 11,860 1.3
Medicaid floors decreased 10 percent
 Bottom 7,600 20,320 1,580 88.6
 Fourth 9,600 19,870 3,010 41.0
 Third 12,240 21,580 5,420 8.9
 Second 18,420 24,980 8,260 3.3
 Top 26,210 32,360 11,850 1.2
Difference
 Bottom −290 −1,790 150 −0.5
 Fourth −210 −1,410 150 −2.0
 Third −140 −1,130 110 −1.0
 Second −100 −650 50 −0.4
 Top −120 −430 −10 −0.1
Percentage differences
 Bottom −3.7 −8.1 10.5 −0.6
 Fourth −2.1 −6.6 5.2 −4.5
 Third −1.1 −5.0 2.1 −9.6
 Second −0.5 −2.5 0.6 −10.6
 Top −0.5 −1.3 −0.1 −7.1
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An important contribution of our paper is to analyze Medicaid in a framework 
where medical expenditures are endogenous. To assess the importance of this fea-
ture, we build a version of the model in which medical expenses are exogenous. We 
do this by finding the stochastic process for exogenous medical expenses that allows 
the model to best fit its estimation targets. We hold preference parameters fixed, so 
that our experiment focuses solely on changes to medical spending. Although our 
process for exogenous medical spending does not depend on wealth or permanent 
income, the medical spending that it generates is fairly similar to that of the endog-
enous medical spending model. We show model predictions for the exogenous med-
ical spending specification in Figure E6 in the online Appendix.
We then use the exogenous medical spending model to  re-evaluate the 10 per-
cent Medicaid cut considered in Tables 8 and 10. The compensating variations 
associated with this experiment are, from the bottom PI quintile to the top: $5,200, 
$5,300, $5,000, $5,700, and $8,400. The similarity between these valuations and 
the valuations in the fifth column of Table 8 is not surprising. The utility floor in the 
endogenous spending model is indexed by consumption, as  u _ =  1 ____ 1 − ν  c _1−ν , which 
is identical to utility in the exogenous spending model when the consumption floor 
is  c _. A 10 percent cut in  c _ thus represents the same reduction in guaranteed util-
ity for both medical spending specifications, and should be valued similarly under 
both specifications.14 Our finding that  high-income retirees often value Medicaid as 
much as poorer retirees is thus robust to making medical expenses exogenous.
When medical spending is endogenous, cuts to the utility floor reduce both con-
sumption and medical expenditures; recall that the transfers are allocated optimally 
between consumption and  out-of-pocket medical spending.15 When medical spend-
ing is exogenous, cuts to the utility floor can only reduce consumption. The transfer 
reductions associated with a cut to the utility floor are thus smaller, and the valu-
ations per unit of spending higher, when medical spending is exogenous. We still 
find, however, that  high-PI people have the highest valuation per dollar of spending.
By way of comparison, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) measure the willingness of 
individuals to pay for private insurance that would top up the gaps in Medicaid cov-
erage. Among other differences in approach, Brown and Finkelstein treat medical 
spending as exogenous, rather than endogenous. Consistent with our results, they 
find that the richest individuals place the highest insurance value on  top-up policies. 
However, while we find that most individuals would value a Medicaid expansion at 
around its actuarial cost, they find that most individuals would value  top-up insur-
ance well in excess of its cost. This difference in results is consistent with the intu-
ition that people who cannot adjust medical spending value Medicaid more relative 
to its cost, because they adjust to shocks along one margin (saving) rather than two 
(saving and medical spending).
not focus on savings. In contrast, in our Medicaid reforms the coinsurance rates remain at their baseline values—the 
intratemporal allocation still obeys equation (17)—and we focus on the effect of Medicaid insurance on savings. 
14 Differences in model dynamics, along with differences in the estimated spending processes, mean the valu-
ations will not be identical. 
15 When  ν and  ω are close in value, as they are in our estimates, equation (17) can be approximated as 
m =  ( μ __q) 
1/ν c , so that medical spending is proportional to consumption. Cuts in the utility floor thus reduce med-
ical and  nonmedical spending by similar proportions. 
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E. Who Selects into Medicaid
Our model generates considerable heterogeneity in health, mortality, and medical 
needs. Although we model Medicaid eligibility as a strict function of financial need, 
individuals with expensive medical conditions are less likely to be able to afford 
the utility floor without assistance. This is not technically adverse selection, as indi-
viduals’ medical conditions are not hidden from the “insurer” (Medicaid), but it 
generates similar selection dynamics. To quantify the extent to which the Medicaid 
population are “adversely selected” on the basis of their medical needs, Table 11 
compares Medicaid recipients to other retirees along several dimensions. We con-
struct Table 11 by simulating the baseline model over the sample period 1996 to 
2010 and taking  cross-sectional averages. The first row of the table shows, unsur-
prisingly, that Medicaid recipients are considerably poorer. The second row shows 
that Medicaid recipients indeed have much higher total medical spending.
Because medical spending in our model represents the convolution of medical 
needs ( μ ) and financial incentives, we also consider the distribution of the medical 
preference shifter  μ . Bajari et al. (2014) measure adverse selection in a similar, 
if more detailed, way. Compared to  non-recipients, the values of  μ that confront 
Medicaid recipients are 4.7 times as likely to lie in the top decile and 28 times as 
likely to lie in the top percentile. In short, Medicaid recipients are more likely to be 
sick, and far more likely to be very sick, consistent with Medicaid’s role as the payer 
of last resort, and consistent with our argument that Medicaid provides valuable 
insurance against catastrophic medical events.
VIII. Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we assess the effects of Medicaid insurance on single retirees. 
Although Medicaid payments decrease with permanent income, even higher income 
people can receive sizable Medicaid payments because they tend to live longer and 
face higher medical needs in very old age. Furthermore, our compensating variation 
calculations show that many higher income retirees value Medicaid insurance as 
much or more than  lower-income ones. Our compensating variation calculations 
also indicate that retirees value Medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost, 
Table 11—Comparison of Medicaid and Non-Medicaid Recipients: Simulations
All retirees Medicaid recipients Non-recipients
Mean net income 16,270 6,240 19,020
Mean medical spending
 Total 28,930 61,820 19,920
 Out-of-pocket 6,680 2,940 7,700
 Medicaid 5,680 26,440 0
Medical needs shifter ( μ )
 Mean 1,270 5,150 210
 Percent in top 50 percent of distribution 50.0 67.9 45.1
 Percent in top 10 percent of distribution 10.0 26.0 5.6
 Percent in top 1 percent of distribution 1.0 4.0 0.1
Percent of population 100.0 19.7 80.3
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but that most would value expansions of the current Medicaid program at less than 
cost. This suggests that the Medicaid program may currently be of the approximate 
right size for currently single retirees.
In the interest of tractability, our framework does not allow households to adjust 
their holdings of LTCI. Although only 9 percent of the households in our AHEAD 
sample hold such insurance, cuts to Medicaid may compel households to increase their 
coverage. Introducing this additional margin of portfolio choice to our model could 
lower our estimates of the value households place on Medicaid. While in Section VIIC 
we argue that there are many reasons to think that introducing LTCI decisions would 
not significantly affect our results, it is worth studying this question more formally.
By focusing on the retirement period, we are able to explicitly model many 
dimensions of uncertainty and heterogeneity and to treat medical expenditures as 
a choice variable. However, it would be valuable to model the entire life cycle, the 
distortions generated by the income taxes needed to finance Medicaid, and the antic-
ipated effects of Medicaid changes at younger ages.
By concentrating on single retirees, we study the population that is most likely 
to receive Medicaid transfers. The data shows that couples tend to be richer and 
less likely to end up in nursing homes and thus receive much smaller Medicaid 
payments. For example, singles in our MCBS sample on average receive $3,760 in 
Medicaid transfers a year, while couples in the same age range on average receive 
$2,140, or $1,070 per person. It nonetheless would be interesting to extend our anal-
ysis to include the valuation of Medicaid insurance by couples.
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